Fraud Prevention and Detection Summit

Radisson Blu Hotel, Sydney, 29 April 2015

Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman

Introduction 

Today I would like to talk about fraud. Not the most pleasant of subjects but nevertheless something we need to talk about in order to make sure that awareness of the potential for fraud is ever present. 

Indeed detecting and deterring fraud is something that sits front and centre in my office’s roles and functions, in particular with our responsibility to oversight the Public Interest Disclosure scheme - the PID scheme. That scheme is a vital piece of the fraud prevention and detection regime that covers the Commonwealth Public Sector. So I see this forum as an ideal one for me to explain the scheme and give some details on its first year or so of operation. 

As well as having a role with the PID scheme, my office considers and investigates complaints from people who believe that they have been treated unfairly or unreasonably by an Australian Government department or agency. We also monitor the operations of law enforcement agencies such as the Australian Federal Police. 

So within the scope of those roles we have a strong focus on promoting ethical behaviour, accountability, fairness and integrity – all of which contribute greatly to detecting and preventing cases of fraud. In addition, a general point needs to be made. We look out for maladministration in the public sector.

We do that, because maladministration leads to a desire on the part of those ‘guilty’ of it to cover it up, which in turn leads to behaviour which is questionable and potentially fraudulent. 

That temptation to cover up can lead to other issues both for the person wanting to cover up the problem and those ultimately responsible for good administration in the public sector, as well as a community member who might be the ‘victim’ of maladministration.

Ombudsman’s role 

Ombudsman institutions have been established in Australia for, in some cases, more than 40 years, handling complaints against every tier of government – state, territory and local – as well as in various industries in the private sector. 

This experience engenders an expertise in complaint handling and in assessing complaint-handling systems.

The notion is now embedded in Australia that people have a right to complain against government, without hindrance or reprisal, and to have their complaint resolved on its merits according to the applicable rules and the evidence available. 

The Commonwealth Ombudsman has no power to force an agency to change a decision or provide a service and must rely on agencies to cooperate to resolve problems. However, the majority of recommendations we make are accepted by agencies.

In contrast, industry ombudsmen have determinative powers. I am very familiar, given my experience in an industry scheme, of the value of having such powers. I am not proposing to deal with the value of such powers in this presentation. 

As a parliamentary ombudsman I may choose to use my ‘own motion’ power to initiate an investigation. I will often exercise this power following receipt of several complaints about the same issue, indicating a recurring problem. 

An own motion investigation can look comprehensively at the scale of a problem, the likely causes and possible remedial action, either specifically in an individual case, or generally. For example, a change to legislation or administrative policies or procedures may be required to deal with such problems and in an own motion report, such a change may be recommended. 

Those reports have become increasingly important, with the uptake of recommendations producing measurable improvements to government administration and service delivery.

It is through reports (own motion and other reports) that ombudsmen, in effect, promote good governance, accountability and transparency. 

Through oversight of government administration and service delivery, we contribute to improving accountability and ethical behaviour in three main ways:

  1. Resolving individual disputes. By investigating complaints from individuals, ombudsmen safeguard citizens against government interference with individual liberties and give them a voice to complain where they would otherwise fear to do so. 1 Ombudsmen are often the only avenue readily available to individual citizens seeking recourse on matters of maladministration or official misconduct that affect their everyday lives. Because ombudsman services are free, they are particularly valuable to poor, marginalised and vulnerable people. Those people are often less likely to be aware of any fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate activity which could adversely affect them. 
  2. Investigating systemic problems. We have the power to investigate broad issues on our own initiative. Problems that may affect many members of the public can be fixed through an ombudsman investigation, followed by publicity for the findings, reporting to the Parliament and subsequent implementation of the recommendations. 
  3. Improving public sector performance. This works in two ways: directly, where the information from complaints about areas of poor service delivery is fed back to agencies from the ombudsman; and indirectly, where the potential oversight of each decision by the ombudsman is an incentive for public servants to improve the quality of their actions and decisions.

As I mentioned at the start, we can add a fourth element: monitoring law enforcement agencies for their compliance with the relevant legislation. 

So that’s a brief overview of my office.

An integrated approach to risk and ethical values 

Before I talk about the Public Interest Disclosure scheme and our other anticorruption work, I’d like to talk a little about what we do in my organisation to help deter fraudulent behaviour and maintain high ethical standards. 

None of this is complex or ground breaking in its approach. But I believe it is incumbent on us, as an integrity agency, to uphold and model the highest levels of ethical behaviour. 

For that reason we place great importance on having a culture that is prepared to identify, acknowledge and address problems. 

In our organisation the importance of leadership is now one of our core values. In the Ombudsman’s Office we are intolerant of any behaviours which encourage a lack of openness between staff members.

I often talk myself about having ‘no secrets in the organisation’ because this approach tends to build a team environment and also establishes an approach which we encourage departments and agencies subject to our jurisdiction to adopt. That is because it encourages an approach which avoids the covering up of maladministration to which I referred earlier.

We also give staff clear information about what is and what is not acceptable. We encourage those to whom we provide a service to talk to managers and supervisors when things don’t seem right, or when they believe things could be done better.

We focus on solutions and improvements rather than defensiveness and blame. And we make sure that every process and program has an owner, so it is clear who to talk to about problems and who is responsible for fixing them. 

Organisations are more effective and efficient when responsibility is shared within those organisations. And so we openly share our problems and work together to resolve them. 

As a result we, I believe, practise what we preach – we have open and transparent dealings with complainants and the agencies we oversight, and we have a workplace that displays – and demands – high ethical standards. 

Public Interest Disclosure scheme 

The PID scheme was introduced in January last year and replaced the previous whistleblower scheme that covered Australian Public Service employees. 

The scheme is part of an integrated approach to managing risk and promoting ethical values in the Commonwealth public sector. 

It includes many upgrades from the previous scheme, but the most noticeable is that it provides protection to the discloser.

It’s important to note that PID does not otherwise replace existing mechanisms for dealing with fraud and wrongdoing in the Commonwealth. 

In essence the PID scheme is a framework that:

My office’s roles in the PID scheme are to: 

I should point out the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security manages the scheme for the agencies under its bailiwick. 

My office also prepares an annual report about the PID scheme for the Minister to present to the Parliament.

Disclosures can be made about Australian Government departments, statutory agencies and office holders, the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, and providers of goods and services under contract to the Commonwealth. 

They can be made about conduct on the part of an agency or a public official that: 

An authorised officer will assess whether the disclosure meets the threshold or criteria for a PID. 

They will then allocate it for investigation (generally within 14 days) and notify my office of the allocation. A delegate will then consider whether to investigate the matter.

During the investigation, the investigator may refer to the police information about suspected commission of an offence against the law of the Commonwealth or an Australian state or territory. 

A report is then sent to the principal officer and the discloser. If the discloser is dissatisfied with investigation, we encourage agencies to offer an internal review or the discloser can complain to my office. 

Other types of protected disclosures under the PID Act 

An external disclosure can be made to anyone, except a foreign public official, on limited grounds, after making an internal disclosure when there is a belief on reasonable grounds that a PID investigation was inadequate, or not completed in time, or reasonable action not taken in response to the investigation. But the disclosure must not, on balance, be contrary to public interest. 

An emergency disclosure can be made where there may be substantial and imminent danger to health or safety or to the environment. 

A legal practitioner disclosure can be made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or professional assistance in relation to disclosure or proposed disclosure. 

As I mentioned earlier, a key part of the PID scheme is that there is support and protection for the discloser.

For example, the discloser’s identity is protected by law, and they can make disclosures anonymously. 

They are protected from the consequences of their disclosure. As a result, the discloser: 

There are exceptions. The discloser is still responsible for the consequences of their own conduct if they are involved in the disclosed matters, and there is no protection for knowingly making a false or misleading statement. 

Making a PID is a workplace right and protected under the Fair Work Act. A person can take action in the Federal Court for remedies for reprisal action. 

I’ll give you some statistics from the first 12 months of operation of the scheme. 

Mandatory reports to the Ombudsman 

In summary, the PID scheme is there to encourage people with inside knowledge to report problems even if they fear reprisal. 

The scheme is only a small part of the bigger picture – agencies need to promote and administer it as part of a range of reporting and investigative mechanisms. 

I would also like to mention the anti-corruption work we do with our colleagues in the Pacific. 

Organisations that investigate complaints from the public, such as ombudsmen, are sometimes seen as peripheral to anti-corruption work.

However, in developing countries without designated anti-corruption organisations, administrative investigations of individual problems are often the only method of oversight of government actions. 

Over the past 10 years my office has managed a number of aid programs in the Pacific. Mostly we have focused on building the capacity of our ombudsman colleagues to investigate and resolve complaints. 

We know that effective complaint-handling decreases corruption over time. 

The experience of members of our Pacific Ombudsman Alliance has been that there are essential pre-conditions for successful complaint-handling, and significant challenges to making a difference to broader government accountability in a way that will have an impact on corruption. 

To add to this challenge, increasingly in recent years we have seen ombudsmen take on the job of fighting corruption in their countries, often without a proper legislative base or an adequate budget.

We have also seen occasional successful anti-corruption work in various countries by other bodies such as police, public prosecutors and NGOs. 

Starting in 2015, we have received aid money to undertake an additional project that aims to fit out ombudsmen with the skills needed to bring together anti-corruption activities.

The project has a dual focus – strengthening the capacity of the ombudsman’s office to achieve their core function, and enabling them to form an anticorruption network both domestically and internationally. 

We are working with the UN Pacific Regional Anti-corruption Project, which assists countries in implementing their Convention Against Corruption obligations. 

Our project is working from the bottom up, looking at what is already there and using the ombudsman’s office to link the functional parts. This work is a small, but very important part of our role. 

Finally, I wanted to make a few additional general points concerning both the role of the Ombudsman and also to summarize what I have been talking about today.

First, I want to draw your attention to and comment on the recent change in the breadth of the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The responsibility for taxation complaints has been removed from our jurisdiction. 

This change contributes, in my view, to the potential for a significant weakening of the integrity system for the Commonwealth Government. The legislation that made the change was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament without any examination of what could possibly be an unintended consequence of a change such as that which has been made.

The responsibility for taxation complaints is now solely the responsibility of the Inspector-General of Taxation. This means there is an organisation handling complaints about the Australian Taxation Office which does nothing else. 

In Australia (and indeed most of the world) this could be described as a ‘unique development’. There are agencies that handle complaints only about police forces. And there are good reasons for having such a regime for the police where it exists in some states in Australia. 

For other types of complaints, in my view, the handling of complaints by one agency, solely about another agency, can lead to either ‘capture’ of the agency handling complaints by the agency in respect of which complaints are received, or the development of a difficult relationship between the two agencies as the complaint agency will not have determinative powers. 

Where a complaints agency does not have such powers, it relies on cooperation. The effectiveness of that complaint-handling agency is at risk unless that ‘cooperative attitude’ is maintained between the agencies.

It is generally thought, worldwide, that having a single agency handling complaints about a single agency is wrong in principle. I believe this to be the case in Australia. Therefore having the role in relation to complaints about the Tax Department solely in the hands of the Inspector-General of Taxation is risky.

It is not of course my intention to reflect upon the capability of the Inspector General and his staff; I just regard the development as risky for the reasons outlined above. 

In summary, therefore, what essentially I have been focused on today is the best way to encourage a corruption-free workplace. 

The most important element of such a regime is to have in place leadership of agencies and departments which is strong and encourages frank and open exchanges between staff, and which is free of reprisal to employees should those employees raise issues of concern to them. 

In my view the PID scheme illustrates this approach because it facilitates the expression of matters of concern by public servants to appropriate people within their work places. 

And I warn that any development of an approach to complaint handling which establishes a regime of one complaint handler for one agency is risky.

1 John Walters, The role of the Ombudsman in promoting and protecting human rights – should it become a national human rights institution?’, Speech delivered at the 2012 IOI World Conference

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      29 April 2015: Fraud Prevention and Detection

      Fraud Prevention and Detection Summit

      Radisson Blu Hotel, Sydney, 29 April 2015

      Colin Neave, Commonwealth Ombudsman

      Introduction 

      Today I would like to talk about fraud. Not the most pleasant of subjects but nevertheless something we need to talk about in order to make sure that awareness of the potential for fraud is ever present. 

      Indeed detecting and deterring fraud is something that sits front and centre in my office’s roles and functions, in particular with our responsibility to oversight the Public Interest Disclosure scheme - the PID scheme. That scheme is a vital piece of the fraud prevention and detection regime that covers the Commonwealth Public Sector. So I see this forum as an ideal one for me to explain the scheme and give some details on its first year or so of operation. 

      As well as having a role with the PID scheme, my office considers and investigates complaints from people who believe that they have been treated unfairly or unreasonably by an Australian Government department or agency. We also monitor the operations of law enforcement agencies such as the Australian Federal Police. 

      So within the scope of those roles we have a strong focus on promoting ethical behaviour, accountability, fairness and integrity – all of which contribute greatly to detecting and preventing cases of fraud. In addition, a general point needs to be made. We look out for maladministration in the public sector.

      We do that, because maladministration leads to a desire on the part of those ‘guilty’ of it to cover it up, which in turn leads to behaviour which is questionable and potentially fraudulent. 

      That temptation to cover up can lead to other issues both for the person wanting to cover up the problem and those ultimately responsible for good administration in the public sector, as well as a community member who might be the ‘victim’ of maladministration.

      Ombudsman’s role 

      Ombudsman institutions have been established in Australia for, in some cases, more than 40 years, handling complaints against every tier of government – state, territory and local – as well as in various industries in the private sector. 

      This experience engenders an expertise in complaint handling and in assessing complaint-handling systems.

      The notion is now embedded in Australia that people have a right to complain against government, without hindrance or reprisal, and to have their complaint resolved on its merits according to the applicable rules and the evidence available. 

      The Commonwealth Ombudsman has no power to force an agency to change a decision or provide a service and must rely on agencies to cooperate to resolve problems. However, the majority of recommendations we make are accepted by agencies.

      In contrast, industry ombudsmen have determinative powers. I am very familiar, given my experience in an industry scheme, of the value of having such powers. I am not proposing to deal with the value of such powers in this presentation. 

      As a parliamentary ombudsman I may choose to use my ‘own motion’ power to initiate an investigation. I will often exercise this power following receipt of several complaints about the same issue, indicating a recurring problem. 

      An own motion investigation can look comprehensively at the scale of a problem, the likely causes and possible remedial action, either specifically in an individual case, or generally. For example, a change to legislation or administrative policies or procedures may be required to deal with such problems and in an own motion report, such a change may be recommended. 

      Those reports have become increasingly important, with the uptake of recommendations producing measurable improvements to government administration and service delivery.

      It is through reports (own motion and other reports) that ombudsmen, in effect, promote good governance, accountability and transparency. 

      Through oversight of government administration and service delivery, we contribute to improving accountability and ethical behaviour in three main ways:

      1. Resolving individual disputes. By investigating complaints from individuals, ombudsmen safeguard citizens against government interference with individual liberties and give them a voice to complain where they would otherwise fear to do so. 1 Ombudsmen are often the only avenue readily available to individual citizens seeking recourse on matters of maladministration or official misconduct that affect their everyday lives. Because ombudsman services are free, they are particularly valuable to poor, marginalised and vulnerable people. Those people are often less likely to be aware of any fraudulent or otherwise inappropriate activity which could adversely affect them. 
      2. Investigating systemic problems. We have the power to investigate broad issues on our own initiative. Problems that may affect many members of the public can be fixed through an ombudsman investigation, followed by publicity for the findings, reporting to the Parliament and subsequent implementation of the recommendations. 
      3. Improving public sector performance. This works in two ways: directly, where the information from complaints about areas of poor service delivery is fed back to agencies from the ombudsman; and indirectly, where the potential oversight of each decision by the ombudsman is an incentive for public servants to improve the quality of their actions and decisions.

      As I mentioned at the start, we can add a fourth element: monitoring law enforcement agencies for their compliance with the relevant legislation. 

      So that’s a brief overview of my office.

      An integrated approach to risk and ethical values 

      Before I talk about the Public Interest Disclosure scheme and our other anticorruption work, I’d like to talk a little about what we do in my organisation to help deter fraudulent behaviour and maintain high ethical standards. 

      None of this is complex or ground breaking in its approach. But I believe it is incumbent on us, as an integrity agency, to uphold and model the highest levels of ethical behaviour. 

      For that reason we place great importance on having a culture that is prepared to identify, acknowledge and address problems. 

      In our organisation the importance of leadership is now one of our core values. In the Ombudsman’s Office we are intolerant of any behaviours which encourage a lack of openness between staff members.

      I often talk myself about having ‘no secrets in the organisation’ because this approach tends to build a team environment and also establishes an approach which we encourage departments and agencies subject to our jurisdiction to adopt. That is because it encourages an approach which avoids the covering up of maladministration to which I referred earlier.

      We also give staff clear information about what is and what is not acceptable. We encourage those to whom we provide a service to talk to managers and supervisors when things don’t seem right, or when they believe things could be done better.

      We focus on solutions and improvements rather than defensiveness and blame. And we make sure that every process and program has an owner, so it is clear who to talk to about problems and who is responsible for fixing them. 

      Organisations are more effective and efficient when responsibility is shared within those organisations. And so we openly share our problems and work together to resolve them. 

      As a result we, I believe, practise what we preach – we have open and transparent dealings with complainants and the agencies we oversight, and we have a workplace that displays – and demands – high ethical standards. 

      Public Interest Disclosure scheme 

      The PID scheme was introduced in January last year and replaced the previous whistleblower scheme that covered Australian Public Service employees. 

      The scheme is part of an integrated approach to managing risk and promoting ethical values in the Commonwealth public sector. 

      It includes many upgrades from the previous scheme, but the most noticeable is that it provides protection to the discloser.

      It’s important to note that PID does not otherwise replace existing mechanisms for dealing with fraud and wrongdoing in the Commonwealth. 

      In essence the PID scheme is a framework that:

      • encourages and supports people with inside knowledge of wrongdoing to report it 
      • obliges agency heads to establish networks of officers to receive disclosures 
      • requires internal investigation of disclosures, except in defined circumstances 
      • entitles the discloser to a copy of the investigation report given to the principal officer 
      • obliges the principal officer to take reasonable action to implement recommendations 
      • gives the Ombudsman oversight and educative responsibilities. 

      My office’s roles in the PID scheme are to: 

      • set PID standards for agencies to follow 
      • provide assistance, education and awareness on the scheme 
      • investigate PIDs in appropriate cases 
      • oversee and monitor agencies’ handling of PIDs 
      • investigate complaints and own motion powers

      I should point out the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security manages the scheme for the agencies under its bailiwick. 

      My office also prepares an annual report about the PID scheme for the Minister to present to the Parliament.

      Disclosures can be made about Australian Government departments, statutory agencies and office holders, the Australian Defence Force, the Australian Federal Police, and providers of goods and services under contract to the Commonwealth. 

      They can be made about conduct on the part of an agency or a public official that: 

      • contravenes a law (including in a foreign country) 
      • is corrupt 
      • perverts the course of justice 
      • results in wastage of public funds or property 
      • is an abuse of public trust or an official’s position 
      • unreasonably endangers health and safety or the environment 
      • is misconduct relating to scientific research, analysis or advice 
      • is maladministration 
      • is conduct that would be grounds for disciplinary action. 

      An authorised officer will assess whether the disclosure meets the threshold or criteria for a PID. 

      They will then allocate it for investigation (generally within 14 days) and notify my office of the allocation. A delegate will then consider whether to investigate the matter.

      During the investigation, the investigator may refer to the police information about suspected commission of an offence against the law of the Commonwealth or an Australian state or territory. 

      A report is then sent to the principal officer and the discloser. If the discloser is dissatisfied with investigation, we encourage agencies to offer an internal review or the discloser can complain to my office. 

      Other types of protected disclosures under the PID Act 

      An external disclosure can be made to anyone, except a foreign public official, on limited grounds, after making an internal disclosure when there is a belief on reasonable grounds that a PID investigation was inadequate, or not completed in time, or reasonable action not taken in response to the investigation. But the disclosure must not, on balance, be contrary to public interest. 

      An emergency disclosure can be made where there may be substantial and imminent danger to health or safety or to the environment. 

      A legal practitioner disclosure can be made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice or professional assistance in relation to disclosure or proposed disclosure. 

      As I mentioned earlier, a key part of the PID scheme is that there is support and protection for the discloser.

      For example, the discloser’s identity is protected by law, and they can make disclosures anonymously. 

      They are protected from the consequences of their disclosure. As a result, the discloser: 

      • cannot be subject to any civil, criminal or administrative liability for making a disclosure 
      • cannot be subject to disciplinary action or be terminated 
      • has absolute privilege in defamation proceedings relating to the disclosure 

      There are exceptions. The discloser is still responsible for the consequences of their own conduct if they are involved in the disclosed matters, and there is no protection for knowingly making a false or misleading statement. 

      Making a PID is a workplace right and protected under the Fair Work Act. A person can take action in the Federal Court for remedies for reprisal action. 

      I’ll give you some statistics from the first 12 months of operation of the scheme. 

      Mandatory reports to the Ombudsman 

      • 759 disclosures received and allocated by 61 agencies
        • 61% were about contravention of an Australian law 
        • 19% were about abuse of position or grounds for disciplinary action 
        • 60% of disclosures were received by the Department of Defence
        • 10% were received by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection
      • 200 decisions not to investigate by 37 agencies
        • 28% not serious disclosable conduct 
        • 26% conduct already investigated or under investigation 
      • My office received: 
        • 14,145 unique page views of our PID website 
        • 269 inquiries about the PID scheme 
        • 34 applications from 19 agencies to extend the investigation time 
        • 71 ‘potential’ disclosures about 30 agencies 
        • 40 complaints about the way other agencies dealt with a disclosure under the PID Act (relating to 18 identified agencies). 

      In summary, the PID scheme is there to encourage people with inside knowledge to report problems even if they fear reprisal. 

      The scheme is only a small part of the bigger picture – agencies need to promote and administer it as part of a range of reporting and investigative mechanisms. 

      I would also like to mention the anti-corruption work we do with our colleagues in the Pacific. 

      Organisations that investigate complaints from the public, such as ombudsmen, are sometimes seen as peripheral to anti-corruption work.

      However, in developing countries without designated anti-corruption organisations, administrative investigations of individual problems are often the only method of oversight of government actions. 

      Over the past 10 years my office has managed a number of aid programs in the Pacific. Mostly we have focused on building the capacity of our ombudsman colleagues to investigate and resolve complaints. 

      We know that effective complaint-handling decreases corruption over time. 

      The experience of members of our Pacific Ombudsman Alliance has been that there are essential pre-conditions for successful complaint-handling, and significant challenges to making a difference to broader government accountability in a way that will have an impact on corruption. 

      To add to this challenge, increasingly in recent years we have seen ombudsmen take on the job of fighting corruption in their countries, often without a proper legislative base or an adequate budget.

      We have also seen occasional successful anti-corruption work in various countries by other bodies such as police, public prosecutors and NGOs. 

      Starting in 2015, we have received aid money to undertake an additional project that aims to fit out ombudsmen with the skills needed to bring together anti-corruption activities.

      The project has a dual focus – strengthening the capacity of the ombudsman’s office to achieve their core function, and enabling them to form an anticorruption network both domestically and internationally. 

      We are working with the UN Pacific Regional Anti-corruption Project, which assists countries in implementing their Convention Against Corruption obligations. 

      Our project is working from the bottom up, looking at what is already there and using the ombudsman’s office to link the functional parts. This work is a small, but very important part of our role. 

      Finally, I wanted to make a few additional general points concerning both the role of the Ombudsman and also to summarize what I have been talking about today.

      First, I want to draw your attention to and comment on the recent change in the breadth of the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Ombudsman. The responsibility for taxation complaints has been removed from our jurisdiction. 

      This change contributes, in my view, to the potential for a significant weakening of the integrity system for the Commonwealth Government. The legislation that made the change was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament without any examination of what could possibly be an unintended consequence of a change such as that which has been made.

      The responsibility for taxation complaints is now solely the responsibility of the Inspector-General of Taxation. This means there is an organisation handling complaints about the Australian Taxation Office which does nothing else. 

      In Australia (and indeed most of the world) this could be described as a ‘unique development’. There are agencies that handle complaints only about police forces. And there are good reasons for having such a regime for the police where it exists in some states in Australia. 

      For other types of complaints, in my view, the handling of complaints by one agency, solely about another agency, can lead to either ‘capture’ of the agency handling complaints by the agency in respect of which complaints are received, or the development of a difficult relationship between the two agencies as the complaint agency will not have determinative powers. 

      Where a complaints agency does not have such powers, it relies on cooperation. The effectiveness of that complaint-handling agency is at risk unless that ‘cooperative attitude’ is maintained between the agencies.

      It is generally thought, worldwide, that having a single agency handling complaints about a single agency is wrong in principle. I believe this to be the case in Australia. Therefore having the role in relation to complaints about the Tax Department solely in the hands of the Inspector-General of Taxation is risky.

      It is not of course my intention to reflect upon the capability of the Inspector General and his staff; I just regard the development as risky for the reasons outlined above. 

      In summary, therefore, what essentially I have been focused on today is the best way to encourage a corruption-free workplace. 

      The most important element of such a regime is to have in place leadership of agencies and departments which is strong and encourages frank and open exchanges between staff, and which is free of reprisal to employees should those employees raise issues of concern to them. 

      In my view the PID scheme illustrates this approach because it facilitates the expression of matters of concern by public servants to appropriate people within their work places. 

      And I warn that any development of an approach to complaint handling which establishes a regime of one complaint handler for one agency is risky.

      1 John Walters, The role of the Ombudsman in promoting and protecting human rights – should it become a national human rights institution?’, Speech delivered at the 2012 IOI World Conference