



Commonwealth
National
Preventive
Mechanism

OPCAT in Action

Airport Holding Cells and Interview Facilities: Observations

August 2026

Table of Contents

- Summary3
 - Our visits 3
- Recommendations and suggestions 4
- Context 6
- Observations 8
 - Conditions8
 - Data Collection.....11
 - Children..... 12
 - Length of detention 12
 - Safety and security..... 13
- Site-specific observations16
 - Melbourne Airport.....16
 - Perth Airport..... 17
- Methodology18
- Mandate.....20
- Agency response..... 21



Summary

Our visits

The Commonwealth National Preventive Mechanism (NPM) conducted announced monitoring visits to airport holding facilities in Brisbane, Darwin, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Adelaide Airports between October 2025 and May 2026.

These visits were the first occasions where the Commonwealth NPM has examined holding facilities located within Australian airports. During these visits, NPM monitors focused on understanding the distinct characteristics of this detention environment, including the conditions and treatment of detained travellers. Monitors also considered the operational challenges faced by staff working in this environment and how that may impact the conditions and treatment of people detained.

I make two (2) general recommendations, two (2) site specific recommendations and one (1) suggestion.



Recommendations and suggestions

Based on our visits to these facilities, I recommend and suggest the following:



Recommendation 1

Within six months, the Department of Home Affairs

- I. ensure all instances of detention are captured in record keeping systems, and
- II. review and upgrade their record keeping systems for detention at international airports to enable centralised data collection and analysis.



Recommendation 2

Within six months, the Department of Home Affairs introduce a program of initial and ongoing refresher training for ABF personnel assigned to airport detention facilities that includes training in behaviour management and behaviour de-escalation techniques.



Suggestion 1

Noting Recommendation 4, the Department consider reviewing the adequacy of CCTV coverage and capability at airport detention facilities.

Site-specific (Perth)



Recommendation 3

Within three months, the Department review the adequacy of staffing at the detention facilities in Terminal 3 at Perth Airport to ensure that the level and profile of staffing is sufficient to meet the needs of people in detention.



Recommendation 4

Within 12 months, the Department review and upgrade CCTV infrastructure at the detention facilities at Perth Airport, including to enable onsite monitoring and address identified gaps in coverage.

Context

Airport holding facilities comprise a range of rooms used to detain individuals whilst questions, enquiries, processing or investigations are undertaken. This includes matters relating to visa status, customs compliance, and other legislative requirements. The facilities are also routinely utilised by the removals teams of the Australian Border Force (ABF) and the Immigration Detention Service Provider, Secure Journeys, to hold individuals prior to removal from Australia.

These environments are intended for short-term detention, including prior to departure from Australia or transfer to another facility (such as an Alternative Place of Detention, an immigration detention centre or law enforcement custody), or while in transit.

Holding facilities at international airports – whether used for migration or customs purposes – are operated directly by the ABF without the involvement of contracted service providers (although as noted above, the facilities may be used by contracted providers during removals). As a place where people are deprived of liberty that is under the control of the Australia Government, airport holding facilities fall within the remit of the Commonwealth NPM.

The ABF maintains a presence at all international airports in Australia. Across the airport network, ABF holding facilities include:

- Interview rooms, for detaining individuals and conducting formal interviews
- Holding rooms equipped with beds and mattresses to accommodate longer periods of detention and to allow for rest
- Dedicated facilities for biometric data collection, either as fixed stations or via mobile trolleys capable of being deployed within interview rooms
- Additional infrastructure such as customs interview rooms and specialised equipment (e.g. dry toilets and internal body scanners).

As compared to the total number of international air travellers, the number of people detained in airport holding facilities is small, and the length of their detention is very short, but the number of people detained is more than the number of people held in

immigration detention in Australia. In 2024–25, for example, over 43 million people travelled to and from Australia through international airports,¹ and 2,373 people were detained in airport holding facilities.²

State/Territory	Facility	Number of people held 24/25
Queensland	Brisbane Airport	344
	Sunshine Coast Airport	0
	Gold Coast Airport	74
New South Wales	Sydney Airport	667
Australian Capital Territory	Canberra Airport	2
Victoria	Melbourne Airport	902
Tasmania	Hobart Airport	0
South Australia	Adelaide Airport	46
Western Australia	Perth Airport	320
Northern Territory	Darwin Airport	18
Total number of people held in 24/25 FY		2,373

¹ [Airport Traffic Data 1985 to 2025](#) (financial years), Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics

² Data provided on request by the Department of Home Affairs

Observations

Conditions


Monitors observed a high degree of consistency in the physical environments across the airport holding facilities they visited. Facilities appeared to be in good working order, clean, free from overt environmental hazards and of an appropriate size for their purpose. Facilities had adequate lighting and seating. The built environment and material conditions in these facilities appeared safe and presented as fit-for-purpose to hold individuals for very short periods of time.



Holding room at Perth Airport

Local practices for the storage of traveller luggage varied between sites. For example, at Brisbane facilities, luggage was stored at the end of a corridor, whereas in Sydney it was stored within office areas. In all locations, luggage storage areas were subject to continuous CCTV monitoring for security purposes. In all locations, luggage was consistently not permitted into interview or holding rooms – however access to necessary items (hygiene products, medication and medical related items) would be facilitated. Facilities also provided secure storage for valuable items in lockers, with people in detention retaining possession of the corresponding keys for the duration of their stay.

Interview rooms were fitted with fixed desks and chairs and equipped with landline telephones with speaker capability. The rooms also included intercom systems and duress alarms, which connected to both adjacent office areas and central control rooms. Holding rooms were similarly equipped with intercom systems.



Holding room (L) and interview room (R) at Melbourne Airport

In all facilities visited, except for Terminal 3 of Perth airport, CCTV coverage of interview and holding rooms was visible to staff from nearby office areas where processing officers and supervisors were located. In addition, staff maintained direct lines of sight into holding rooms from these areas.

Shift inspectors advised monitors that staff are afforded an appropriate level of delegation and autonomy to respond to the individual needs of people in detention in a timely and flexible manner. Observations of staff interactions during visits suggested a highly professional and respectful organisational culture across facilities.

Staff advised that they facilitate contact between people in detention and their support networks where appropriate, while maintaining the integrity of the secure environment and any formal interview processes, including those conducted under caution. Monitors were advised that all people in detention are permitted to access legal assistance and are provided with information regarding their rights.

Monitors were advised that people in detention are able to access telephone interpreting via the Translating and Interpreting Service. In addition, staff have developed practical tools to support communication with non-English speakers, including visual aids such as flash cards depicting food options, toiletries and other basic needs to assist individuals in communicating their preferences. Purposeful activity for people detained

was not an area of focus as monitors were told the amount of time spent in detention was minimal (typically less than 6 hours).

Monitors were advised that ABF staff have access to a virtual health care centre with services provided by Health Care Australia (HCA) for initial basic health needs including for mental health consultations.

Monitors were advised that searches are performed on people prior to them coming into the holding cells. These are performed by a person of the same gender as the person in detention (with the option for transgender people to nominate their preference for a male or female officer). Monitors were advised that searches are not performed on children under the aged of 16 and would only be performed on older children (16 to 17 years old) on the basis of a risk assessment and only with a Justice of the Peace or independent observer present.

Facilities also included customs-specific infrastructure to support the enforcement functions of the ABF. These included equipment and spaces for the safe handling and verification of firearms; work areas for the preliminary testing of suspected illicit substances; and specialised facilities such as dry toilets and internal body scanners for cases where there are concerns regarding internal concealment of contraband. Monitors were advised that the use of dry toilets and internal body scanners is infrequent, with such matters typically referred to law enforcement and medical services offsite. This remains an area of ongoing interest for the Commonwealth NPM, although it is not examined in detail in this post visit summary.

Overall, there was a high degree of consistency in the practices of ABF and in the infrastructure of the facilities across sites observed by monitors. Given the sites had unique operating environments, there was also an appropriate level of responsiveness from respective location staff to the nuances of their sites. With the exception of some training gaps, staff at locations appeared highly professional and to have an appropriate understanding of the importance of their role both for the Australian community and the impacts their decisions have on travellers seeking to enter the country.

The practices described to Monitors were broadly consistent with contemporary good practice for short duration places of detention, particularly the emphasis on minimising the duration of detention and impacts on minors. This includes facilitating the timely

progression of individuals to alternative outcomes, such as transfer to immigration detention, release to continue their journey or removal from Australia, consistent with the principle that people subject to immigration detention should only be detained for the shortest possible time.

Data Collection

Monitors observed consistent good practices across sites in the completion and maintenance of individual client records for people in detention. However, while data on people in detention is maintained at the local level, there was no centralised database to capture information on individuals detained across airport sites. The absence of a centralised database limits the Department's capacity to identify trends in facility use, including patterns, volumes and the nature of detention. This may in turn hamper consideration at a national level of whether detention facilities in airports are fit for purpose and ensure adequate conditions for people in detention.

Monitors also received advice at some locations that usage statistics for holding rooms may not capture all instances of use. For example, where individuals are transferred from Immigration Detention to an airport for removal from Australia the airport holding rooms may be used to hold the detained person whilst waiting for their removal flight. Whilst this occurs in coordination with ABF airport staff, records of this type of use are maintained by the Removals team and may not be consistently reflected in local holding room records. This creates a risk of under-reporting in relation to the overall utilisation of airport holding facilities.



Recommendation 1

Within six months, the Department of Home Affairs review and upgrade their record keeping systems for detention at international airports to enable centralised data collection and analysis and ensure all instances of detention are captured in record keeping systems.

Children

Airport holding facilities accommodate individuals across a range of demographics, including adults, families and individuals travelling with children as well as unaccompanied minors. Staff from ABF demonstrated awareness of and responsiveness to the specific needs of children and families in these environments. Monitors were advised that staff take reasonable steps to minimise the impact of detention processes on children. These included:

- Efforts to avoid placing children in interview or holding rooms wherever practicable
- Providing access to appropriate food options including flexibility to source food items from within the airport, or nearby vendors
- Items to support the wellbeing of children, including toys, activities, comfort packs, blankets, water and pillows.

Monitors were advised that, in circumstances where unaccompanied minors are detained for questioning, an independent third party is present. This role is most commonly undertaken by a Justice of the Peace, or an airline staff representative under existing arrangements between airports and airlines.

Length of detention

Data provided by the Department of Home Affairs indicates that during the 2024-25 reporting period, 19 individuals were held in airport holding facilities for periods exceeding 6 hours. Of these, one case occurred in Melbourne, with the remaining 18 occurring across the Brisbane and Gold Coast airports. Monitors were advised that extended periods of detention (that is, more than 4 hours) were generally attributable to logistical factors, including flight availability and the availability of escorts for transfer to immigration detention facilities.

Monitors received consistent feedback from staff regarding the administrative complexity associated with visa cancellation and refusal of immigration clearance processes. While staff acknowledged the seriousness and consequences of their

decisions, Monitors were informed that the administrative requirements – including documentation and the availability of delegated decision-makers – can extend processing times to approximately four hours.

Monitors did not have an opportunity to review these clearance processes and administrative requirements in detail and therefore are not in a position to form a view about potential opportunities to reduce processing times. Monitors also noted the importance of ensuring that administrative processes enable sound decision-making and ensure procedural fairness, particularly where the decision could have significant consequences for the individual concerned (as is often the case with visa decisions).

With these caveats, and based on the information communicated by staff, Monitors noted that there may be scope to streamline some administrative practices that could delay the processing of decisions (such as availability of delegated decision-makers) without affecting substance or rigour of the decisions themselves. As noted above, airport holding cells are intended to be used for short-term detention, and the conditions observed by Monitors were considered fit-for-purpose for only very short periods of detention. In this context, ensuring that administrative practices do not unduly extend the length of detention in airport facilities would help to reduce the health and wellbeing risks associated with lengthier periods of detention.

Safety and security

While the roles of ABF staff in airport settings are often administrative and client facing in nature, they also perform border protection functions which carry the associated physical and psychosocial risks for people in detention and staff. Although formally reported rates of occupational violence are low relative to the number of individuals processed, staff reported to Monitors more frequent incidents of verbal abuse and behavioural escalation than were captured in official reporting, suggesting that there may be underreporting of such incidents. These incidents were described as often occurring in circumstances where travellers have experienced extended periods in transit, followed by several hours in detention and the delivery of adverse immigration outcomes.

The ABF may at times seek support from the Australian Federal Police, for example, when a person in detention is behaving in an aggressive manner. Monitors observed variation

across sites in the effectiveness of interagency relationships between the ABF and AFP. Some locations reported strong, cooperative working arrangements, characterised by regular communication and timely operational support. At some other sites, however, staff reported difficulties in securing AFP assistance when required, including delays of over an hour in responding to incidents of escalating and aggressive behaviour from travellers.

Monitors were advised that ABF staff receive limited training in the use of physical restraints, defensive tactics and related operational safety measures. Training provided includes an online Operational Safety module and a three-day course incorporating elements of de-escalation; however, participation in the latter is voluntary and subject to medical clearance requirements. Staff with advanced operational safety training had typically obtained these qualifications through prior roles in other operational environments, such as maritime or field operations.

Monitors consider that, where staff are assessed as medically fit for duty, training frameworks should prioritise inclusion, with exemptions applied only where necessary, to ensure staff are adequately equipped to manage the risks inherent in these environments. Staff also identified limited availability and frequency of training courses delivered by the Department of Home Affairs as a barrier to developing and maintaining relevant capabilities.

Across several sites within the network, the quality of CCTV monitors within ABF offices was also identified as requiring varying levels of remediation. In some sites, the resolution of CCTV monitors was sub-optimal, reflective of dated equipment, which can inhibit officers' ability to effectively monitor the wellbeing of people detained in their facilities and delay responses to incidents. As airport holding facilities all have observation windows, Monitors did not have immediate concerns about risks to the safety of people in detention in most facilities but noted that upgrades to CCTV infrastructure would assist in ensuring appropriate monitoring of people in detention.



Recommendation 2

Within six months, the Department of Home Affairs introduce a program of initial and ongoing refresher training for ABF personnel assigned to airport detention facilities that includes training in behaviour management and behaviour de-escalation techniques.



Suggestion 1

Noting Recommendation 4, the Department consider reviewing the adequacy of CCTV coverage and capability at airport detention facilities.

Site-specific observations

Melbourne Airport

Data provided by the Department of Home Affairs indicates that Melbourne Airport recorded the highest number of detentions across the ABF airport network during the 2024-25 financial year, with 902 individuals held during this period.

Data provided also highlighted Melbourne Airport as having the highest number of reported occupational violence incidents against staff, with 11 incidents recorded over the that timeframe. Sydney Airport, which held the second-largest number of people (667) in airport detention facilities over the same timeframe and had a larger number of passenger movements than Melbourne in 2024-25³, reported only 2 occupational violence incidents. Reasons for the disproportionate number of occupational violence incidents in Melbourne were not readily apparent and warrant further investigation and potentially remedial action to ensure the safety of staff and travellers.

Supporting staff to manage challenging behaviour and de-escalate incidents (as per Recommendation 2) would go some way to addressing concerns about staff safety at airport detention facilities, including in Melbourne. Staff in Melbourne also suggested to Monitors that one of the interview rooms at the facility could be modified to include additional security features, such as a physical barrier, to ensure the safety of staff. Monitors did not have significant concerns about this suggestion, noting that another interview room would still be available for use in instances where additional security features are not needed. However, given that airport detention facilities are intended to be used for very short periods of detention and must cater for people with widely varying needs and risk profiles (including children), the introduction of more stringent security features that could impact conditions of detention in these facilities should generally be approached with caution.

³ [Airport Traffic Data 1985 to 2025](#) (financial years), Bureau of Infrastructure and Transport Research Economics

Perth Airport

Perth was the only airport visited by Monitors where a person was detained in the holding facilities at the time of the visit. The person was observed to be treated with respect and with appropriate acknowledgement of their circumstance by the ABF. However, some gaps were identified including with the CCTV coverage and the availability of same-gender officers to ensure all processes could be attended to while maintaining a person's dignity.

The ABF holding facilities at Perth Airport are located across Terminals 1 and 3. Terminal 3 is utilised less frequently, and Monitors identified some minor inconsistencies between the 2 sites. For example, sanitary disposal bins were available in detainee bathroom facilities at Terminal 1 but not at Terminal 3.

At Terminal 3, CCTV coverage of the interview room was not visible from the adjacent office area and was instead monitored remotely via a central control room within the airport. This arrangement means that, in the event of an incident requiring an immediate response, monitoring staff would need to identify and notify the onsite officer by telephone, despite their close physical proximity. This may delay timely intervention. Monitors also identified gaps in CCTV coverage within the holding facilities at Terminal 1 Perth airport, including in certain corridors and transit areas.



Recommendation 3

Within three months, the Department review the adequacy of staffing at the detention facilities in Terminal 3 at Perth Airport to ensure that the level and profile of staffing is sufficient to meet the needs of people in detention.



Recommendation 4

Within 12 months, the Department review and upgrade CCTV infrastructure at the detention facilities at Perth Airport, including to enable onsite monitoring and address identified gaps in coverage.



Methodology

The primary function of an NPM is visiting places of detention.

The Commonwealth NPM visits places of detention to:

- Monitor the treatment of people in detention and the conditions of their detention.
- Identify any systemic issues where there is a risk of torture or ill-treatment.
- Make recommendations, suggestions, or comments promoting systemic improvement.

The Commonwealth NPM conducts three types of visits: announced, unannounced, and semi-announced. The type, location, and timing of each visit is determined by the Commonwealth NPM alone.

Each place of detention is assessed in terms of its performance based on the management and conditions for people in detention. We have adapted our usual method of assessment to fit the temporary nature of airport holding facilities but use the overarching five indicators of a healthy detention facility to guide our assessment. The five indicators are adapted from those used by other international and domestic visiting bodies.

The five indicators of a healthy centre are:⁴

Safety	People in detention are held in safety and that consideration is given to the use of force and disciplinary procedures as a last resort.
Respect	People in detention are treated with respect for their human dignity and the circumstances of their detention.
Purposeful activity	The detention facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical wellbeing of people in detention.
Wellbeing and social care	People in detention are able to maintain contact with family and friends, support groups, and legal representatives, and have a right to make a request or complaint.
Physical and mental health	People in detention have access to appropriate medical care equivalent to that available within the community. Stakeholders work collaboratively to improve general and individual health conditions for people in detention

⁴ These indicators have been adapted from expectations used by international and domestic inspectorates.

Mandate

The *Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment* (OPCAT) is an international human rights treaty designed to strengthen protections for people deprived of their liberty.

OPCAT does not create new rights for people who are detained, rather it seeks to reduce the likelihood of mistreatment. OPCAT combines monitoring at an international level (by the Subcommittee for the Prevention of Torture) and by National Preventive Mechanisms (NPMs) at a domestic level.

NPMs are independent visiting bodies, established in accordance with OPCAT, to examine the treatment of persons deprived of their liberty, with a view to strengthening their protection against torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.

An NPM is not an investigative body. The mandate of an NPM differs from other bodies working against torture in its preventive approach: it seeks to identify patterns and detect systemic risks of torture, rather than investigating or resolving complaints concerning torture or ill-treatment. A separate team within the Office of the Commonwealth Ombudsman, outside the NPM, receives and considers complaints from people in detention.

In July 2018, the Australian Government announced the Commonwealth Ombudsman as the visiting body for Commonwealth places of detention (the Commonwealth NPM). At present, the Commonwealth NPM visits places of detention run by:

- the Department of Home Affairs
- the Australian Federal Police
- the Australian Defence Force.



Australian Government
Department of Home Affairs

SECRETARY

Our ref: EC26-003982

Your ref: A2580397

Mr Iain Anderson
Commonwealth Ombudsman
GPO Box 442
Canberra ACT 2601

Iain
Dear Mr Anderson,

Thank you for your letter of 10 July 2026 enclosing the draft report *OPCAT in Action – Airport Holding Cells and Interview Facilities: Observations*, following the Commonwealth National Preventive Mechanism's (NPM's) monitoring visits to airport holding facilities between October 2025 and May 2026.

The Department of Home Affairs values its constructive engagement with the Commonwealth NPM and has carefully considered the report's findings and recommendations. We recognise the importance of maintaining appropriate conditions for detained travellers and of ensuring that our practices continue to reflect Australia's OPCAT obligations and community expectations.

A detailed response to the report's recommendations is provided at **Attachment A**. The Department agrees to all recommendations and the suggestion contained in the report.

Should your office have further questions in relation to this matter, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
placed to assist. Alternatively, you are welcome to contact me directly if that is helpful.

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]
Stephanie Foster PSM

31 July 2026

**Department of Home Affairs response to OPCAT in Action –
Airport Holding Cells and Interview Facilities: Observations**

Recommendation 1: Within six months, the Department:

- i. ensure all instances of detention are captured in record keeping systems, and
- ii. review and upgrade their record keeping systems for detention at international airports to enable centralised data collection and analysis.

The Department of Home Affairs **agrees** to this recommendation.

The Department currently uses two distinct systems to record the movement and management of people in detention. In practice, the two systems support each other. The Integrated Client Service Environment (ICSE) system maintains the client's immigration and application history and can be used to flag detention-related information through notes and alerts, while the Compliance, Case Management and Detention Portal (CCMD) is the primary operational system for recording, managing, monitoring detention, compliance, and case management activities throughout a client's immigration pathway.

ISCE consolidates client information, visa and citizenship application records, permission requests, and assessment events into a single client history. While ICSE is not the primary system used to record detention events, it can be used to record Client of Interest notes, notify departmental staff of detention activity, compliance concerns, or other immigration-related risks. ICSE also provides an auditable record of client interactions, with all access and actions logged against the client record.

CCMD is the primary system used to support visa compliance, case management, and detention operations. It was designed to provide a single view of a person's immigration pathway from initial compliance activity through to an immigration outcome, such as visa grant, status resolution, removal, or voluntary departure. CCMD records visa compliance activities, detention and accommodation events, case management actions, departmental decisions, returns and removals, and other compliance-related information. It is the system used to manage and document the operational aspects of detention activity and supports a nationally consistent approach to detention management.

The Department will ensure that CCMD is used to record all instances of detention at airports. Moreover, the Department will review what data can be analysed centrally.

Recommendation 2: Within six months, the Department introduce a program of initial and ongoing refresher training for ABF personnel assigned to airport detention facilities that includes training in behaviour management and behaviour de-escalation techniques.

The Department **agrees** to this recommendation.

As part of its operational safety continuum, the Australian Border Force (ABF) currently delivers two operational safety programs that collectively provide officers with skills in communication, behaviour management, conflict resolution and de-escalation.

Stage 1: Operational Safety Awareness is an online course that introduces officers to operational safety principles, behavioural awareness, communication techniques, conflict management concepts and officer safety considerations. The course provides officers with the knowledge required to assess and manage interactions with members of the public in a professional and proportionate manner.

Stage 2: Operational Safety Skills and Tactics is a practical, instructor-led program that builds upon the knowledge and concepts introduced in Stage 1. The program develops officers' capability to manage higher-risk and more dynamic operational encounters through behavioural observation, identification of pre-attack indicators, communication and de-escalation strategies, scenario-based exercises, decision making under pressure, and the application of approved low level defensive tactics where appropriate. The program is designed to equip officers to safely manage resistance, aggression and escalating behaviours while maintaining a focus on communication, professionalism, and resolution wherever possible.

These programs are available to officers undertaking public facing operational roles, including officers who may be required to operate within Airport Holding Cells and Interview Facilities. In late 2025, the Operational Safety Training Unit also delivered a number of dedicated Stage 2 Operational Safety Skills and Tactics courses for airport-based personnel. These courses were specifically targeted towards officers operating within the airport environment and further enhanced capability in behaviour management, communication, de-escalation.

The Department will ensure that training packages are delivered to all staff operating in a detention capacity within the airport environment, including appropriate refresher courses.

Recommendation 3: Within three months, the Department review the adequacy of staffing at the detention facilities in Terminal 3 at Perth Airport to ensure that the level and profile of staffing is sufficient to meet the needs of people in detention.

The Department **agrees** with and has addressed this recommendation.

The Department has addressed the adequacy of staffing levels at Terminal 3, Perth Airport. Staffing arrangements have evolved from a model where officers were deployed between terminals on a flight-by-flight basis. Since February 2026, WA Aviation Operations has continued to increase the number of dedicated officers based at Terminal 3.

The increase in permanently based Terminal 3 staff provides the ABF with sufficient operational capability to ensure appropriate supervision of any persons detained or accommodated within interview and holding rooms.

The enhanced staffing model also ensures ABF can meet requirements relating to the gender of detained persons. For example, where a detained person is male, two male officers can be deployed to supervise and manage that person. Similarly, where a detained person is female, two female officers can be deployed. This arrangement ensures appropriate supervision, welfare, and officer safety requirements are maintained at all times.

Recommendation 4: Within 12 months, the Department review and upgrade CCTV infrastructure at the detention facilities at Perth Airport, including to enable onsite monitoring and address identified gaps in coverage.

The Department **agrees** to this recommendation.

This recommendation is actively being implemented between the Department and Perth Airport, with negotiations already commenced. Perth Terminal 1 and Terminal 3 international terminals are both currently undertaking a full site assessment in preparation for upgrade works which will address this recommendation within 12 months.

WA Aviation Traveller Operations has engaged with the Closed-Circuit Television and Enforcement Communications Section (CCTV & EC) to install infrastructure to enable onsite monitoring.

The upgrades are intended to ensure interview rooms, holding rooms, and adjacent operational work areas are appropriately monitored to enhance officer safety, improve situational awareness, and mitigate the risks associated with aggressive or violent behaviour. In addition, these enhancements will strengthen ABF's ability to effectively supervise persons in detention and ensure appropriate monitoring controls are in place to meet operational and welfare requirements.

Suggestion 1: Noting Recommendation 4, the Department consider reviewing the adequacy of CCTV coverage and capability at airport detention facilities.

The Department **agrees** to this suggestion.

The Department is actively monitoring and assessing the adequacy of current CCTV footage across all Ports of Entry into Australia to support the ABF Operational CCTV network.

The Department is addressing capacity issues including replacing 250+ CCTV workstations and upgrading video management software. Monitors can be replaced via existing mechanisms for equipment upgrades.

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